Global Swing States and the Human Rights and Democracy Order

Editor’s Note: This paper was originally published by the German Marshall Fund of the United States. You can also download the related report titled “Global Swing States: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Turkey, and the Future of International Order.” It is republished here with due permission.

The convergence of values and divergence of methods between the “global swing states” — Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Turkey — and the world’s established democracies are on particular display in the arena of democracy and human rights. To varying degrees, all four nations are prepared to play a role in supporting international mechanisms to strengthen human rights and democracy, but this is to be done on their own terms: through quiet diplomacy and mediation, using coercive methods only as a last resort. The challenge before Western democracies is to evaluate when to seek convergence with global swing states on international interventions to uphold human rights and when to yield to parallel efforts that may entail less control but greater acceptance and therefore greater effectiveness on the ground.

How Global Swing States View the Human Rights and Democracy Order

India

India, the world’s most populous democracy, was a leader in the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War, and the anti-imperialist and noninterventionist roots of its foreign policy run deep. Yet as it emerges as a global economic power and a rival to China, its status as a secular, pluralist, and democratically governed state is slowly beginning to influence its behavior toward the internationalhuman rights and democracy order.

At the United Nations, India has scrupulously avoided criticizing the human rights records of other states, viewing such criticism as an inappropriate intervention in internal affairs. Its robust support of the U.N. Democracy Fund and its membership in the steering committee of the Community of Democracies reflect its preferred approach of cooperative engagement through the U.N. and its passive promotion of democracy and human rights values. A key factor in India’s decision to participate in these two initiatives was its desire to forge closer ties with the United States, which worked hard under the George W. Bush administration to secure New Delhi’s support.

Like Brazil, India seeks to win a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. India is willing to associate itself with multilateral initiatives that support democratization in countries already on the democratic path and those that actively request assistance from India or the larger international community[1]. It also has been quick to use democracy-related forums on the international stage to distinguish itself from autocratic and corrupt regimes in neighboring Pakistan and the authoritarian capitalist model presented by China.

Apart from the U.N. and Community of Democracies initiatives, examples of India’s multilateral activism to support democracy and human rights in other countries are few. Until recently, its regional organization, SAARC, had virtually no mandate or activities related to democracy and human rights. Although there is little to suggest that India played any special role in promoting the SAARC Charter on Democracy, there is some evidence that India has used its leverage at SAARC to protest non-democratic behavior. In 2005, for example, India refused to attend the Dhaka SAARC Summit, forcing its postponement; India justified this by citing the seizure of power by the King of Nepal and concern over worsening security conditions in Bangladesh. India has also played an active role in rallying the Commonwealth, an association of countries affiliated with the British crown, to condemn coups and impose sanctions on military regimes in both Fiji and Pakistan.[2]

India’s drive to best Pakistan for regional supremacy is a key factor explaining its active role in supporting the government in Kabul against the Taliban in Afghanistan. In keeping with India’s cautious support for democracy and its desire for closer relations with Washington, it joined the international community’s efforts to build Afghanistan’s democratic institutions by supporting construction of the Afghan parliament building, parliamentary training, material support for elections, and over $1 billion in other forms of assistance. India also worked closely with the United States and the European Union to pressure the monarchy in Nepal to accept far-reaching constitutional changes and an eventual fall from power in favor of representative democracy.[3]

India is starting to find its comfort zone in speaking on the global stage in favor of democracy as a preferred foundation for international peace and cooperation while insisting that its assistance be sought out rather than imposed. In responding to the wave of demands for democracy and human rights across the Arab world, however, India has largely hunkered down in the non-interventionist camp, adamant that it supports democracy in principle but should not interfere in the affairs of other states.[4] India’s largely passive response to the Arab Spring reflects its general approach to global democracy and human rights, as well as its complicated economic and expatriate ties to the Middle East.

The Indian government categorized the uprisings in Egypt and Libya as an “internal affair” and prioritized the safety of its citizens living there. [5] As international forces mobilized to protect civilians in Libya, India’s non-interventionist posture tangibly manifested itself at the U.N. Security Council, where it sat as a non-permanent member at the time. When the Security Council passed Resolution 1970, extending sanctions on certain Libyan officials and referring the situation to the International Criminal Court, India joined the unanimous endorsement. A month later, however, India abstained when the Security Council authorized force to protect civilians and implemented a no-fly zone. In an explanation of its abstention, India insisted that political measures ought to be the primary course of action for ending the violence.[6] India further bolstered its South-South solidarity credentials by endorsing the African Union’s roadmap for Libya, saying that decisions related to Africa “should be left to the Africans.”[7]

In Syria, India’s natural non-interventionist tendency, coupled with its view that the NATO mission had exceeded the confines of its mandate, made it even less inclined to act in the event of violent crackdowns. Bilaterally, India continued its relationship with the Syrian regime, displaying its preference for mediation and political dialogue. A desire not to disturb relations with Iran, an important oil supplier, may have also influenced India’s reticence to act against the Assad regime. Similar circumstances and priorities influenced India’s reaction to uprisings in Bahrain, where India has the additional complication of ensuring the safety of its more than 350,000 nationals there — the largest of Bahrain’s expatriate communities.

Overall, India’s response to the Arab Spring is typical of its ongoing balancing act between supporting democratic values in principle on one hand, and non-interventionist pragmatism on the other. Howe
ver, it is important to highlight India’s actions that have deviated from the noninterventionist approach, including its endorsement of sanctions against Libya and referral to the International Criminal Court, its abstention (not opposition) to the Libya no-fly zone and intervention, and its vote in favor of the use of U.N. forces to protect civilians in Côte d’Ivoire. These efforts reveal that as India ascends to a leadership role, it is delicately attempting to maintain legitimacy in the West by supporting democracy while preserving its bona fides in the Non-Aligned Movement.

Ted Piccone is a Senior Fellow and Deputy Director for Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution.

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